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Abstract. We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games,
with ‘memory-aware’ agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our
attention on the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, as it constitutes an emblematic example of a game whose Nash
equilibrium is defection. Previous investigations showed that, under opportune conditions, it is possible
to reach, in the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma, an equilibrium of cooperation. Notably, it seems that
mechanisms like motion may lead a population to become cooperative. In the proposed model, we map
agents to particles of a gas so that, on varying the system temperature, they randomly move. In doing
so, we are able to identify a relation between the temperature and the final equilibrium of the population,
explaining how it is possible to break the classical Nash equilibrium in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma
when considering agents able to increase their payoff over time. Moreover, we introduce a formalism to
study order-disorder phase transitions in these dynamics. As result, we highlight that the proposed model
allows to explain analytically how a population, whose interactions are based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
can reach an equilibrium far from the expected one; opening also the way to define a direct link between
evolutionary game theory and statistical physics.
PACS. 89.20.-a Complex Systems – 87.23.Cc Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation –
05.90.+m Other topics in statistical physics, thermodynamics, and nonlinear dynamical systems
1 Introduction
Evolutionary games [1,2,3] represent the attempt to study
the evolution of populations [4,5,6] by the framework of
game theory [7]. Notably, these games allow to analyze
simplified scenarios in different domains, spanning from
socio-economic dynamics to biological systems [8,9,1,10,
11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. In general, evolutionary games con-
sider a population of agents whose interactions are based
on games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (hereinafter PD)
or the Hawk-Dove game [4], where there are two possi-
ble strategies: cooperation and defection. As in classical
game theory, the concept of equilibrium represents a core
aspect [18]. Therefore, we aim to evaluate if a popula-
tion reaches an equilibrium equal or different from the
expected one, i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the considered
game. At each interaction, agents gain a payoff according
to the adopted strategy and to a payoff matrix. The payoff
represents a form of reward in the considered domain (e.g.,
money in an economic system or food in an ecosystem).
Remarkably, as agents are allowed to change their strategy
over time, we can map them to spins with states σ = ±1,
representing cooperation and defection, respectively. In
doing so, we can analyze order-disorder transitions in the
spatial PD. Previous studies [19,20,21,22,23,24,25] have
shown that, under particular conditions, it is possible that
a population playing a game like the PD, i.e., a game char-
acterized by defection as Nash equilibrium, can be able
to reach a final state of full cooperation. For instance, it
seems that both motion [19,20,21,22] and competitive-
ness [24] can lead an agent population to cooperate [26]
and, more in general, spatial structure plays a key role
in the evolution of cooperation [27,28]. Usually, adding
properties to agents, as motion, conformity and competi-
tiveness, entails to increase the complexity of the resulting
model. Thus, most investigations on evolutionary games
are based on computational approaches. Therefore, in this
work we try to provide an analytical description of the
spatial PD, in order to explain how a population can
become cooperative and to strengthen the link between
evolutionary game theory [29] and statistical physics [30].
It is worth to highlight that we consider ‘memory-aware’
agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time.
Remarkably, this last condition represents the major dif-
ference with most of the evolutionary game models studied
by computational approaches (see for instance [31,32]).
On the other hand, considering ‘memory-aware’ agents
makes the problem more tractable from an analytical per-
spective. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 introduces the proposed model and its an-
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alytical formulation. Section 3 shows analytical results.
Eventually, Section 4 ends the paper.
2 Model
In the proposed model, we are interested in studying the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma by an analytical approach. Let
us start by introducing the general form of a payoff matrix
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(1)
where the set of strategies is Σ = {C,D}: C stands for
‘Cooperator’ and D for ‘Defector’. In the matrix 1, R is
the gain obtained by two interacting cooperators, T rep-
resents the Temptation, i.e., the payoff that an agent gains
if it defects while its opponent cooperates, S the Sucker’s
payoff, i.e., the gain achieved by a cooperator while the
opponent defects, eventually P the payoff of two interact-
ing defectors. In the case of the PD, matrix elements of 1
are: R = 1, 0 ≤ S ≤ −1, 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and P = 0. As
stated before, during the evolution of the system agents
can change their strategy from C to D, and vice versa,
following an updating rule, as for instance the one named
‘imitation of the best’ (see [19,4]), where agents imitate
the strategy of their richest neighbor.
2.1 Mean field approach
Now, we consider a mixed population of N agents with,
at the beginning, an equal density of cooperators and de-
fectors. Under the hypothesis that all agents interact to-
gether, at each time step the payoffs gained by cooperators
and defectors are computed as follows{
pic = (ρc ·N − 1) + (ρd ·N)S
pid = (ρc ·N)T (2)
with ρc + ρd = 1, ρc density of cooperators and ρd den-
sity of defectors. We recall that defection is the dominant
strategy in the PD and, even if we set S = 0 and T = 1,
it corresponds to the final equilibrium because pid is al-
ways greater than pic. At this point, it is important to
highlight that previous investigations [19,20,21] have been
performed by ‘memoryless’ agents (i.e., agents that do not
accumulate the payoff over time) whose interactions were
defined only with their neighbors, and focusing only on
one agent (and on its neighbors) at a time. These condi-
tions are fundamental. For instance, if at each time step we
randomly select one agent interacting only with its neigh-
bors, there exists the probability to select consecutively
a number of close cooperators; thus, in this occurrence,
very rich cooperators may emerge and then prevail on de-
fectors, even without introducing mechanisms like motion.
It is also worth to observe that as P = 0, a homogeneous
population of defectors does not increase its overall payoff.
Instead, according to the matrix 1, a cooperative popula-
tion continuously increases its payoff over time.
Now, we consider a population divided into two groups
by a wall: a group Ga composed of cooperators, and a
mixed group Gb, i.e., composed of cooperators and defec-
tors in equal amount. Agents interact only with members
of the same group, then the group Ga never changes and,
in addition, it strongly increases its payoff over time. The
opposite occurs in the group Gb, as it converges to an
ordered phase of defection, limiting its final payoff. Re-
markably, in this scenario, we can introduce a strategy
to modify the equilibria of the two groups. In particular,
we can both change to cooperation the equilibrium of Gb,
and to defection that of Ga. In the first case, we have to
wait a while, before moving one or few cooperators to Gb,
so that defectors increase their payoff, but during the re-
vision phase they change strategy to cooperation as the
newcomers are richer than them. In the second case, if
we move after few time steps a small group of defectors
from Gb to Ga, the latter converges to a final defection
phase. These preliminary and theoretical observations let
emerge an important property of the ‘memory-aware’ PD:
considering the two different groups, cooperators may suc-
ceed when act after a long time and individually. Instead,
defectors may succeed acting fast and in group. Notably,
rich cooperators have to move individually since otherwise
many rich cooperators risk to increase too much the pay-
off of defectors that, in this case, will not change strategy.
The opposite holds for defectors that, acting in group, may
strongly reduce the payoff of a community of cooperators
(for S < 0).
2.1.1 Mapping agents to gas particles
We hypothesize that the spatial PD, with moving agents,
can be successfully studied by the framework of kinetic
theory [30]. Therefore, in the proposed model, we map
agents to particles of a gas. In doing so, the average speed
of particles is computed as < v >=
√
3Tskb
mp
, with Ts sys-
tem temperature, kb Boltzmann constant, and mp particle
mass. Particles are divided into two groups by a permeable
wall, so that it can be crossed by particles, but it avoids
interactions among particles belonging to different groups.
Now, it is worth to emphasize that we can provide a dual
description of our system: one in the ‘physical’ domain of
particles, the other in the ‘information’ domain of agents.
Notably, to analyze the system in the ‘information’ do-
main we will introduce, as above discussed, the mapping
of agents to a spin system (see [33]). Summarizing, we map
agents to gas particles in order to represent their ‘physi-
cal’ property of motion, and we map agents to spins for
representing their ‘information’ property (i.e., their strat-
egy). Remarkably, these two mappings can be viewed as
two different layers for studying how the agent population
evolves over time. Although the physical property (i.e.,
the motion) affects the agent strategy (i.e., its spin), the
equilibrium can be reached in both layers/domains inde-
pendently. This last observation is important since we are
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interested in evaluating only the final equilibrium reached
in the ’information’ domain. Then, as stated before, agents
interact only with those belonging to the same group, so
the evolution of the mixed group Gb can be described by
following equations
dρbc(t)
dt = p
b
c(t) · ρbc(t) · ρbd(t)− pbd(t) · ρbd(t) · ρbc(t)
dρbd(t)
dt = p
b
d(t) · ρbd(t) · ρbc(t)− pbc(t) · ρbc(t) · ρbd(t)
ρbc(t) + ρ
b
d(t) = 1
(3)
with pbc(t) probability that cooperators prevail on defec-
tors (at time t), and pbd(t) probability that defectors pre-
vail on cooperators (at time t). These probabilities are
computed according to the payoffs obtained, at each time
step, by cooperators and defectors{
pbc(t) =
pibc(t)
pibc(t)+pi
b
d(t)
pbd(t) = 1− pbc(t)
(4)
The system 3 can be analytically solved provided that, at
each time step, values of pbc(t) and p
b
d(t) be updated. So,
the density of cooperators reads
ρbc(t) =
ρbc(0)
ρbc(0)− [(ρbc(0)− 1) · e
τt
Nb ]
(5)
with ρbc(0) initial density of cooperators in G
b, τ = pbd(t)−
pbc(t), and N
b number of agents in Gb. Recall that setting
Ts = 0, not allowed in a thermodynamic system, corre-
sponds to a motionless case, leading to the Nash equi-
librium in Gb. Instead, for Ts > 0 we can find more in-
teresting scenarios. Now we suppose that, at time t = 0,
particles of Ga are much closer to the wall than those of
Gb (later we will relax this constraint); for instance, let us
consider a particle ofGa that, during its random motion, it
is following a trajectory of length d (in the n-dimensional
physical space) towards the wall. Assuming this particle
is moving with speed equal to < v >, we can compute
the instant of crossing tc =
d
<v> , i.e., the instant when it
moves from Ga to Gb. Thus, on varying the temperature
Ts, we can vary tc.
Let us consider the payoff of cooperators in the two groups.
Each cooperator in Ga gains
piac = (ρ
a
c ·Na − 1) · t (6)
On the other hand, the situation for cooperators in Gb
is much more different as, according to the Nash equi-
librium, their amount decreases over time. Therefore, we
can consider how changes the payoff of the last cooperator
survived in Gb
pibc =
t∑
i=0
[(ρbc ·N b − 1) + (ρbd ·N b)S]i (7)
moreover, pibc → 0 as ρbc → 0. At t = tc, a new cooperator
reaches Gb, with a payoff computed with equation 6.
3 Results
The analytical solution 5 allows to analyze the evolution
of the system and to evaluate how initial conditions affects
the outcomes of the model. Let us observe that, if piac (tc)
is enough big, the new cooperator may modify the equi-
librium of Gb, turning defectors to cooperators. Notably,
the payoff considered to compute pbc, after tc, corresponds
to piac (tc), as the newcomer is the richest cooperator in G
b.
Furthermore, we note that piac (tc) depends on N
a, hence
we study the evolution of the system on varying the pa-
rameter  = N
a
Nb
, i.e., the ratio between particles in the
two groups. Eventually, for numerical convenience, we set
kb = 1 · 10−8, mp = 1, and d = 1.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Gb, for  = 1 on varying
Ts and, depicted in the inner insets, the variation of sys-
tem magnetization over time (always inside Gb) computed
as [34]
M =
∑Nb
i=1 σi
N b
(8)
with σi strategy of the i-agent. As discussed before, in
the physical domain of particles, heating the system en-
tails the average speed of particles increases. Thus, under
the assumption that two agents play together if they stay
close (i.e., in the same group) for a long enough time,
we hypothesize that exists a maximum speed such that
for greater values interactions do not occur (in terms of
game). This hypothesis requires a critical temperature Tc,
above which no interactions, in the ‘information’ domain,
are possible. As shown in plot f of figure 1, for temper-
atures in range 0 < Ts < Tmax the system converges to
a cooperation phase (i.e., M = +1), for Tmax < Ts < Tc
the system follows the Nash equilibrium (i.e., M = −1),
and for T > Tc a disordered phase emerges at equilibrium.
Remarkably, results of our model suggest that it is always
possible to compute a range of temperatures to obtain an
equilibrium of full cooperation —see figure 2. Moreover,
we study the variation of Tmax on varying  (see figure 3)
showing that, even for low , it is possible to obtain a time
tc that allows the system to converge towards coopera-
tion. Eventually, we investigate the relation between the
maximum value of Ts that allows a population to become
cooperative and its size N (i.e., the number of agents).
Remarkably, as shown in figure 4, the maximum Ts scales
with N following a power-law function characterized by a
scaling parameter (i.e., an exponent) γ ∼ 2. The value of
γ has been computed by considering values of Ts shown
in figure 2 for the case  = 2. Eventually, it is worth to
highlight that all analytical results let emerge a link be-
tween the system temperature and its final equilibrium.
Recalling that we are not considering the equilibrium of
the gas, i.e., it does not thermalize in the proposed model,
we emphasize that the equilibrium is considered only in
the information domain.
3.1 Phase Transitions in the spatial PD
As discussed before, in the information domain we can
study the system by mapping agents to spins, whose value
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Fig. 1. From a to e: Evolution of the group Gb, with N = 100 and  = 1, on varying the temperature: a. Ts = 0. b. Ts = 0.1.
c. Ts = 9. d. Ts = 15. e. Ts = 50. Insets show the system magnetization over time. The istant t = tc, can be detected in plots
c,d,e as a discontinuity of the two lines (i.e., red and black). f. Final magnetization M , of Gb, for different temperatures (Tc
indicates the ‘critical temperature’).
Fig. 2. Maximum values of temperature Ts that allow the
group Gb to converge to cooperation. Red values correspond
to results computed with  = 0.5, while blue values to those
computed with  = 1. Circles are placed in the TS diagram
indicating values of T and S, of the payoff matrix, used for
each case. Even for high values of T , and small values of S, it
is possible to achieve cooperation.
represents their strategy. In addition, we can map the dif-
ference between winning probabilities, of cooperators and
defectors, to an external magnetic field: h = pbc − pbd. In
Fig. 3. Maximum value of system temperature that allows
to achieve cooperation at equilibrium versus  (i.e., the ratio
between particles in the two groups). Different colors identify
different trends, fitted by power-law functions. After the final
green plateau, temperatures are too high to play the spatial
PD.
doing so, by the Landau theory [30], we can analytically
identify an order-disorder phase transition. Notably, we
analyze the free energy F of the spin system on varying
the control parameter m [35] (corresponding to the mag-
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Fig. 4. Maximum value of Ts to achieve full cooperation at
equilibrium in function of N , i.e., the size of the population.
The fitting function (dotted line) is a power-law characterized
by a scaling parameter equal to 2.
netization M)
F (m) = −hm± m
2
2
+
m4
4
(9)
where the sign of the second term depends on the temper-
ature, i.e., positive for Ts > Tc and negative for Ts < Tc;
recalling that Tc represents the temperature beyond which
it is not possible to play the PD due to the high particles
speed (according to the condition before discussed). For
the sake of clarity, we want to emphasize that the free en-
ergy is introduced in order to evaluate the nature of the
final equilibrium achieved by the system. In particular,
looking for the minima of F allows to investigate if our
population reaches the Nash equilibrium, or different con-
figurations (e.g., full cooperation). Figure 5 shows a pic-
torial representation of the phase transitions that occur in
our system, on varying Ts and the external field h. Finally,
the constraints related to the average speed of particles,
and to the distance between each group and the perme-
able wall, can in principle be relaxed as we can imagine
to extend this description to a wider system with several
groups (as done in previous investigations, e.g. [20]), where
agents are uniformly spread in the whole space. It is worth
to highlight that our results are completely in agreement
with those achieved by authors who studied the role of
motion in the PD (as [19,20]), explaining why clusters
of cooperators emerge in their simulations [20]. We also
recall that, in the proposed model, we are using memory-
aware agents, while in previous computational investiga-
tions agents reset their payoff at each step, i.e., before to
start new interactions.
4 Conclusions
To conclude, in this work we provide an analytical de-
scription of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, by using the
framework of statistical physics, studying the particular
case of agents provided with memory of their payoff (de-
fined memory-aware agents). This condition entails that
their payoff is not reset at each time step, so that they can
increase it over time. In particular, we propose a model
based on the kinetic theory of gases, showing how motion
may lead a population towards an equilibrium far from the
expected one (i.e., the Nash equilibrium). Remarkably, the
final equilibrium depends on the system temperature, so
that we have been able to identify a range of tempera-
tures that triggers cooperation for all values of the payoff
matrix (related to the PD). In addition, we found an in-
teresting relation between the maximum temperature that
foster cooperation and the size of the system. Notably, a
scaling parameter in that relation has been computed by
investigating different orders of magnitude of the size of
the system. Furthermore, the dynamics of the resulting
model have been also described in terms of order-disorder
phase transitions. Finally, we deem that our results open
the way to define a direct link between evolutionary game
theory and statistical physics.
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